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THE COST OF A HIGHER EDUCATION:
POST-MINORITY CHILD SUPPORT IN NORTH DAKOTA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The states are sharply divided over whether a noncustodial parent
should be responsible for providing child support for his or her child’s postsecondary education.1 Several questions arise: If the court does allow postminority child support, how does it determine a logical stopping point?2
How does the court justify ordering a noncustodial parent to provide college
support for his or her child when married couples have no such obligation?3
Is it warranted to deny a child an educational opportunity when the noncustodial parent has the ability to provide for such education but simply
refuses to help?4 If the court does allow for such support, should it be
limited in duration and amount?5
Part II of this note will provide a brief overview of how post-minority
support for college expenses is handled across the United States, identifying
the advantages and disadvantages of such support. Part III will provide an
in-depth look at how North Dakota is managing the situation. This note
will examine the history of North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2
(Support for Children after Majority) and take an exhaustive look at the
few, but imperative, North Dakota cases relevant to this issue.
II. FIFTY STATE OVERVIEW
In 1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was adopted, which lowered the legal voting age from twenty-

1. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Termination of Child Support and Support
Beyond Majority, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/educate.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005)
(explaining that there are several approaches to post-minority support for college expenses).
2. See Robert M. Washburn, Post-Minority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 319,
328 (1971) (stating that it is reasonable that a noncustodial parent’s duty to pay support should
terminate at some point).
3. See, e.g., Kathleen Conrey Horan, Postminority Support for College Education—A Legally
Enforceable Obligation in Divorce Proceedings?, 20 FAM. L.Q. 589, 605 (1987) (addressing the
constitutional concerns of imposing a duty of post-minority support on divorced parents when
married parents have no such obligation).
4. See Donarski v. Donarski, 1998 ND 128, ¶ 21, 581 N.W.2d 130, 136 (asserting that a
parent’s ability to pay post-minority support is the most significant factor to consider when awarding such support).
5. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476, 479 (N.D. 1994) (declining to set a
strict age limit on the award of post-minority child support).
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one to eighteen.6 Most states then passed laws reducing the age of majority
to eighteen for most other purposes.7 This change had a major impact on
family law litigation: It essentially decreased the duty to pay child support
by three years and eliminated child support throughout the child’s college
years.8 Whereas a twenty-one-year-old may be more or less finished with
college, many eighteen-year-olds are still in high school.9 Prior to the
change in the age of majority, courts could provide for college expenses by
increasing the amount of child support as needed when the child entered
college.10
Following this change to the age of majority, states were divided into
effectively three different categories in terms of the way they addressed
post-minority child support for college expenses: (1) jurisdictions which
compelled post-minority support, even absent an agreement between the
parties; (2) jurisdictions which enforced post-minority support pursuant to
an agreement by the parties only; and (3) jurisdictions which neither compelled post-minority support nor enforced any agreements of such between
the parties.11 According to a recent study by the National Conference of
State Legislatures, approximately half of the states fall into the first category, allowing their courts to award post-minority support for a child’s
college education regardless of whether the parties agreed to such a
condition.12 The remaining half of the states fit into the second category,
allowing for the award of post-minority support for college expenses only
upon agreement between the parties.13 Only Alaska falls within the third
category, prohibiting the courts from requiring either party to pay for postmajority college support.14

6. Horan, supra note 3, at 590 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 591.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 1 (concluding that the courts in
Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Washington, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia
all have the authority to award some type of post-minority child support for college expenses past
the age of majority).
13. See id. (concluding that the courts in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming only have the authority to award post-minority child
support for college expenses upon agreement by the parties).
14. See id. (concluding that courts in Alaska will not allow post-minority support for college
expenses).
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A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF POST-MINORITY SUPPORT
The desire to provide children with a college education is a common
argument in favor of post-minority support.15 A college education is indispensable to obtaining and holding a reasonably well-paid and secure employment position.16 Compared to times past when a college education was
only available to a privileged few, a college education today has become an
economic necessity.17 College enrollment has drastically increased over the
past three decades.18 In 1980, 26 percent of eighteen-to twenty-four-yearolds attended college.19 That number increased to 32 percent in 1990.20 By
2003, 41 percent of the nation’s youth attended college.21
Years ago, children were generally more accustomed to supporting
themselves at an earlier age since a college education was relatively uncommon.22 In contrast, children of today remain in school for a longer
period of time, and consequently do not mature or become self-sufficient
until later in life.23 Hence, children are maturing later in life but are expected to assume responsibility earlier.24 Stated in a different way, a child’s
employment opportunities do not improve merely because he reaches the
age of majority.25 If a child cannot get a suitable job without a college
education, and if he is incapable of earning a living while attending school,
then the extent of support should be determined by the facts of each case. 26
The age of the child should not be the only determinative factor the court
considers when addressing the issue of post-minority support.27
Just as the number of individuals attending college has increased, so
has the cost of acquiring such an education.28 Between 1989 and 1990, the

15. Horan, supra note 3, at 603.
16. See id. at 604 (citing French v. French, 378 A.2d 1127, 1129 (N.H. 1977)) (stating that as
a result of present conditions, with rare exceptions, no individual’s education is completed at age
eighteen, nor in practically all professions, until well after age twenty-one).
17. Id. at 603 (citing Washburn, supra note 2, at 326).
18. Nat’l Cent. for Educ. Statistics, Youth Indicator 22: College Enrollment (2005),
http://www.nces.ed.gov/programs/youthindicators/Indicators.asp?PubPageNumber=22.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Horan, supra note 3, at 604.
23. Washburn, supra note 2, at 329.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 328.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Nat’l Cent. for Educ. Statistics, Youth Indicator 24: College Costs (2005),
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/youthindicators/Indicators.asp?PubPageNumber=24. The net cost is
equal to tuition and fees, plus estimated cost of living expenses, minus all grants received by the
student. Id.
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average annual net cost at a four-year public university was $8,900.29 In the
academic year 1999-2000, that figure increased to $10,500.30 Because of
the growing trend of receiving a college education, custodial parents may be
faced with a double dilemma of child support terminating just when their
expenses for the child are reaching an all-time high.31 Children of divorce,
as well as their custodial parents, are less likely to be in a position to afford
college.32 Coincidently, these same children have an even greater need for
the education to offset some of the disadvantages stemming from the
divorce.33 This predicament leaves the child and custodial parent at a
greater risk for social and economic difficulties.34
The financial strains placed upon children of divorce and the custodial
parents are further enhanced if the noncustodial parent’s income becomes a
factor in eligibility for financial aid.35 The federal government does not
consider the noncustodial parent’s income and assets in determining a
student’s financial needs.36 However, many private colleges do consider
the noncustodial parent as a potential source of support and require a supplemental financial aid form from the noncustodial parent, which may
affect the awarding of the school’s own aid.37 For example, Georgetown
University’s financial aid policy states:
[P]arental responsibility for educational costs does not cease upon
divorce or separation. The University expects that both natural
parents (even when divorced or separated) will provide funds for
educational expenses based on their ability to contribute from their
income and assets. Both natural parents will be expected to submit
financial information and to provide assistance for the student’s

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Horan, supra note 3, at 602 (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION
278 (1985)).
32. Judith G. McMullen, Father (or Mother) Knows Best: An Argument Against Including
Post-Majority Education Expenses in Court-Ordered Child Support, 34 IND. L. REV. 343, 366
(2001).
33. Id. Children of divorce are disadvantaged not only financially, but emotionally as well.
Id. at 367. “Wallerstein and Blakeslee reported that in a group they studied, one third of the
children were doing significantly worse five years after the divorce, when factors such as
depression, behavior and learning problems were considered.” Id. (citing JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN
& SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER
DIVORCE 158-59 (1989)).
34. Id.
35. Horan, supra note 3, at 602-03.
36. FinAid, Divorce and Financial Aid—Obligation to Help Pay for College,
http://www.finaid.org/questions/divorce.phtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
37. Id.
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college expenses commensurate with their ability rather than their
willingness to contribute.38
Thus, the noncustodial parent’s income may increase the child’s and the
custodial parent’s financial obligation, yet the noncustodial parent does not
share the financial consequence of this fact.39
Finally, the court’s ability to award post-minority support mitigates the
harsh economic impact of the divorce on children.40 Providing postminority support is intended to ensure that a child’s life opportunities are
not unduly diminished by the family breakdown.41 It also ensures that a
parent who does not reside with a child invests in the child’s future as he or
she would if he or she were sharing a home with the child.42 By allowing
post-minority child support for college expenses, the court is acting in loco
parentis in an attempt to place the child in the position he or she would
have been in but for the divorce.43
It is no mystery that parents have sustained the vast burden of paying
for their children’s college educations.44 In contrast to past centuries, the
business of parents paying to educate their children has become the main
occasion for intergenerational wealth transfer.45 A child’s education is
replacing inheritance, as lifetime transfers are displacing succession on

38. Georgetown
Univ.
Undergraduate
Bulletin
2005-2006,
available
at
http://www/georgetown.edu/undergrad/bulletin/expenses3.html.
Eligibility for Georgetown
scholarship assistance is based on the income and assets of either the custodial parent and
stepparent or the custodial parent and noncustodial parent. Id. A contribution will be sought from
only two of the three parties, but information is collected from all three in order to determine
ability to contribute towards educational expenses. Id.
39. Id.
40. Horan, supra note 3, at 605.
41. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: PROVIDING FOR A CHILD’S
LIFE OPPORTUNITIES § 3.12 (2002). The A.L.I. provides:
(1) [T]he child-support rules should provide that a child not suffer loss of life
opportunities that the child’s parents are able to provide without undue hardship to
themselves or their other dependents. (2) Life opportunities should include but not be
limited to: (a) postsecondary education and vocational training; (b) preprimary,
primary and secondary education; and (c) specialized education and training
appropriate to the child’s special talents or disabilities. . . .
Id.
42. Id.
43. See Horan, supra note 3, at 605 (citing Patrick C. Marshall, Post-Minority Child Support
in Dissolution Proceedings, 54 WASH. L. REV. 459, 470-71 (1979)) (stating that post-minority
support allows the court to mitigate the harsh impact of divorce on children). In loco parentis is
Latin for “in the place of a parent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004). It means
relating to or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking all or some of the
responsibilities of a parent. Id.
44. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722, 732 (1988).
45. Id.
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death.46 In the past, children expected transfers of the farm or estate. 47
Today, children expect help paying for their educations and do not depend
upon wealth transfers at their parents’ deaths.48
B. ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO POST-MINORITY SUPPORT
One prevailing concern courts have with awarding post-minority
support for college expenses is whether it is constitutionally permissible to
impose such a duty on divorced parents when married parents have no such
obligation.49 The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that persons who are similarly situated in relation to a statute must
be treated in the same manner.50 Because the issue of post-minority child
support is not related to a suspect classification,51 courts need only apply
rational basis scrutiny when deciding if a statute awarding such support is
constitutional.52 Under rational basis scrutiny, a statute is constitutional if it
is rationally related to some legitimate government interest.53 When considering post-minority child support, states have a legitimate interest in
protecting the welfare of children and society as a whole.54 Therefore, the
argument that awarding post-minority child support is unconstitutional has
been unsuccessful in most situations.55
An additional concern is the lack of control given to the noncustodial
parent who is ordered to pay support.56 While most married parents are
willing to assist their child in obtaining a higher education, the parents
retain some control over their adult child and can withdraw support at any
time.57 On the other hand, a parent who has been ordered to pay college
support may have no control over his or her child, specifically pertaining to

46. Id. at 735.
47. Id. at 736.
48. Id.
49. Horan, supra note 3, at 605.
50. Lindsay E. Cohen, Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College Education? Children of Divorce
and the Constitutional Implications of Noncustodial Parents Providing for Higher Education, 66
MO. L. REV. 187, 194 (2001).
51. See id. (declaring that traditionally, only classifications based on race, national origin,
and illegitimacy have constituted “suspect classes”).
52. Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 209 (Wash. 1978).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Horan, supra note 3, at 605. See generally Cohen, supra note 50, at 196 (stating that
very few statutes allowing support for post-secondary education have been struck down as
unconstitutional).
56. Horan, supra note 3, at 605-06.
57. Id. at 605 (citing Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1984)).
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the choice of school, field of study, academic performance, and living
arrangements.58
Another legitimate concern is whether it is fair to award support to a
child who has not seen or interacted with the noncustodial parent in several
years and does not maintain any relationship with that parent.59 Sending a
child to college is expensive and can require much sacrifice on the part of
the parent.60 A child’s behavior toward, and relationship with, the noncustodial parent should be considered when deciding if the child is worthy
of the additional efforts and financial burdens placed upon that parent.61
Some commentators argue that the gift of an education is a form of an
intergenerational transfer of wealth, such as an inheritance, and in this
country, testators are practically unrestricted in their ability to transfer their
possessions or disinherit their children if they so desire.62 Just as a testator
may prefer to spend all of his money or to leave all his property to a
surviving spouse rather than to his children, a divorced parent may prefer to
devote his current resources to an individual other than his child.63 A
testator might disinherit a child on the belief that the parent has already
provided adequately for the child, or because the parent believes the child
does not need the support.64 A testator can influence his children’s actions
by either rewarding them for good behavior or punishing them for bad
behavior.65 In comparison, a noncustodial parent may also feel that he or
she has already provided adequate support for the child.66 However, unlike
the testator, the noncustodial parent lacks control over the child.67 Any
direct incentive for the child to maintain a cordial relationship with the
noncustodial parent is removed when post-minority support becomes
mandatory.68 The child is allowed to reject the noncustodial parent’s value
system with no ramifications.69 It is unreasonable to deny divorced parents

58. Id. at 606.
59. Id.; see Hambrick v. Prestwood, 382 So. 2d 474, 477-78 (Miss. 1980) (holding that the
father had no duty to pay his daughter’s college expenses when the daughter had not seen her
father for six to seven years and was extremely hostile toward him).
60. Hambrick, 382 So. 2d at 477.
61. Id.
62. Langbein, supra note 44, at 733; McMullen, supra note 32, at 353.
63. McMullen, supra note 32, at 363.
64. Id. at 364.
65. Id. at 365.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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the ability to use punishments and rewards to influence their children’s
behavior.70
Another negative impact of awarding post-minority child support is the
lack of notice to the noncustodial parent regarding when his or her support
obligation will end.71 If child support terminates at majority, a noncustodial
parent can plan his finances accordingly.72 However, if a custodial parent
can modify that support obligation to cover higher educational expenses
past the age of majority, the noncustodial parent is trapped with an
unanticipated support obligation for an indefinite length of time.73 Paying
for post-majority expenses could jeopardize the financial goals of the
noncustodial parent, such as maintaining a comfortable lifestyle or saving
for retirement.74 People today need a good deal of money to retire comfortably, and middle-aged parents may prefer to ensure their own financial
security rather than spending or borrowing heavily to pay for the college
education of their children.75
Many states take the position that when an adult child is healthy and
able-bodied, there is no reason why the child should not pay his or her own
way through school.76 A noncustodial parent may wish to decline to pay
for the child’s higher education because of the parent’s belief that the child
should be independent.77 Just as married parents have the opportunity to
influence their child’s maturity, so should divorced parents.78
Finally, there is the notion that voluntary support to adult children from
their parents is more likely to foster a close parent/child relationship, as
compared to a court-ordered obligation.79 The goal of post-minority support is to replicate, as closely as possible, the decisions that an intact family
would make, and not to make wholesale awards of college tuition.80 The
following section of this article will provide a look at North Dakota’s
specific views on post-minority college support.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 364-66.
Horan, supra note 3, at 606.
Id.
Id.
McMullen, supra note 32, at 364.
Id.
Horan, supra note 3, at 607.
McMullen, supra note 32, at 366.
Id.
Horan, supra note 3, at 607.
Id.
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III. NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota has an unsettled history regarding post-minority child
support for college expenses.81 A lack of clarity in the legislature’s intent
has resulted in disparate North Dakota Supreme Court decisions regarding
this issue.82 This section of the note provides a chronological overview of
North Dakota’s development of college support, taking an in-depth look at
major North Dakota Supreme Court cases and various statutory enactments
and amendments to North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2, the
provision governing post-minority support.
A. DAVIS V. DAVIS
In 1978, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Davis v. Davis,83 a
case of first impression regarding post-minority child support for college
expenses in North Dakota.84 As part of a divorce decree, the trial court
ordered the husband, the noncustodial parent, to pay $10,000 into a trust for
each of his four minor children, for the educational benefit of each child.85
Any funds remaining in the trust were payable to the child upon attaining
the age of twenty-two.86
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision,
stating that “[t]here has been a trend toward awarding moneys for the
furthering of education for children, including a college education, by the
courts of the various States, even though the parents are divorced.”87 The
court, relying on an American Law Report, stated that courts have expressly
recognized the duty of a divorced parent to provide a child not only with an
elementary and secondary education, but a college education as well.88 The

81. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004) (stating that the trial court is not precluded
from awarding child support beyond the age of eighteen if the parties agree or if the court
otherwise determines the support to be appropriate); Zarrett v. Zarrett, 1998 ND 49, ¶ 14, 574
N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (holding that a trial court is authorized to order child support past the age of
eighteen if the court determines the support to be appropriate). But see Larson v. Larson, 2005
ND 67, ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d 13, 14 (holding that the trial court did not have the authority to award
post-minority child support for college expenses).
82. See Donarski v. Donarski, 1998 ND 128, ¶ 19, 581 N.W.2d 130, 136 (holding that a trial
court has the authority to order post-minority child support for college expenses under appropriate
circumstances). But see Larson, ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d at 13 (holding that the trial court did not have
the authority to award post-minority child support for college expenses).
83. 268 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1978).
84. Davis, 268 N.W.2d at 777.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 778.
88. Id. See generally E. Le Fevre, Annotation, Education as an Element in Allowance for
Benefit of Child in Decree of Divorce or Separation, 56 A.L.R. 2D 1207, 1209 (1957) (providing
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Davis court further explained that the determination to award post-minority
support should be based on certain factors, including the financial condition
of the parents, and the family standard of living prior to the divorce.89 The
court stated, “We are not unaware of the increasing necessity of a college
education or its equivalent, as well as the tremendous escalation of the costs
of securing such an education.”90 The Davis decision was particularly
important because it set a precedent in North Dakota for awarding postminority child support for college expenses, absent any statutory provision
granting such authority.91
B. ENACTMENT OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE
SECTION 14-09-08.2
In 1989, the North Dakota Legislature enacted North Dakota Century
Code section 14-09-08.2, which requires a noncustodial parent to continue
child support payments for a child that has attained the age of majority
(eighteen years old) but is still enrolled and attending high school and
residing with the parent to whom the duty of support is owed.92 The statute
provides for child support to continue until the child graduates from high
school or attains the age of nineteen.93 This enactment signifies the first
and only North Dakota statutory provision allowing child support to
continue past the age of majority.94
C. 1991 AMENDMENT TO NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE
SECTION 14-09-08.2
In 1991, the legislature amended the newly enacted statute to clear up a
few minor administrative difficulties, specifically, which party is responsible for serving the affidavit stating that the child is over eighteen years of
age and still in high school, and who must provide such notice to the
noncustodial parent.95 The amendment requires the clerk of court to serve
an affidavit by certified mail on any person owing support for a child
eighteen years of age, if that child is currently enrolled in high school, and
cases which affirm the courts’ ability to award post-minority child support for a college
education).
89. Davis, 268 N.W.2d at 778.
90. Id.
91. See id. (recognizing the duty of divorced parents to provide a child with a college
education).
92. Act of Mar. 31, 1989, ch. 180, 1989 N.D. Laws 551, 551.
93. Id.
94. See id. (awarding child support beyond the age of majority if the child is still in high
school).
95. Act of Mar. 11, 1991, ch. 151, 1991 N.D. Laws 418, 418.
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the original judgment did not specifically provide for the child support to
continue.96
D. 1993 AMENDMENT TO NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE
SECTION 14-09-08.2
The 1993 amendment to section 14-09-08.2 had a considerable impact
on post-minority child support for college expenses.97 The legislature
added an additional subsection which provides, “This section does not
preclude the entry of an order for child support which continues after the
child reaches eighteen, if the parties agree or if the court determines the
support to be appropriate.”98 Although the legislative history is limited in
regard to this addition, one statement holds particular importance: “The
amendment clarifies that this is not the only basis under which support
could continue after age eighteen.”99 This subsection opens the door for
awards of post-minority child support for college expenses, as it provides
courts with a legal avenue created by the legislature to order such
support.100
E.

ANDERSON V. ANDERSON

In 1994, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Anderson v.
Anderson,101 another case pertaining to the award of college support.102
This case involved a stipulated divorce agreement between Lane and Myrna
Anderson.103 The agreement provided that Lane, the noncustodial parent,
would be responsible for each child’s college expenses for up to four years
of college, so long as the child maintained passing grades.104 Lane,
however, received a break from such obligations so long as the college
expenses were covered by other sources, specifically from financial gifts to
the children from Lane’s parents.105 The dispute arose when the oldest

96. Id.
97. See Act of Apr. 15, 1993, ch. 152, 1993 N.D. Laws 621, 623 (adding statutory language
to allow the court to order child support past the age of majority in certain situations).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Hearing on H B. 1181 Before the H. Human Serv. Comm., 1993 Leg., 53d Sess. (N.D.
1993) (statement of Blaine L. Nordwall, Director of Legal Advisory Unit, North Dakota
Department of Human Services).
100. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(6) (2004) (granting the court authority to award
post-minority support when it deems the support to be appropriate).
101. 522 N.W.2d 476 (N.D. 1994).
102. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d at 477.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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child was required to obtain financial aid to pay for her fourth year of
college after she had exhausted all the funds from her paternal grandparents’ trust.106 The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the divorce
judgment and ordered Lane to provide Myrna with $12,720.44 for college
support for the oldest child’s fourth year of education.107
Lane argued that the trial court did not have authority to award postminority support past the age of twenty-two, pursuant to Davis v. Davis.108
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument, declining to set a
strict age limit for college support.109 It instead directed the trial court to
use its informed discretion.110
In the alternative, Lane argued that his post-minority support obligation
should only require him to pay college expenses at in-state institutions
where the child has been accepted.111 The North Dakota Supreme Court,
facing a question of first impression, relied on a Pennsylvania decision
which stated, “We are reluctant to formulate a rule which would, in all
cases, prevent a child from attending the college of his choice simply
because it is more expensive than the state-supported university.”112 The
Anderson court did caution, however, that the child should not have
absolute discretion in selecting a college, thereby unilaterally increasing the
parent’s support obligation.113 Rather, the determination of whether such
an additional burden should be imposed on the noncustodial parent is a
matter for the trial court.114
The Anderson court, recognizing the ever increasing necessity of a
college education, as well as the escalating cost of such an education, held
that “[b]alancing these countervailing forces is a job for which the trial
court is uniquely qualified.”115 The Anderson court further advised that the
trial courts should analyze the advantages offered by the more expensive
college compared to the child’s individual needs and abilities.116 Courts
must then weigh these advantages against the increased hardship that would
be imposed on the noncustodial parent to determine whether the additional

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 478.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 479 (citing Davis v. Davis, 268 N.W.2d 769, 778 (N.D. 1978)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Larson, 234 A.2d 18, 20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479-80
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expense is reasonable under the circumstances.117 The Anderson case
represents the first North Dakota decision to uphold a stipulated divorce
judgment where the parties agreed on the award of post-minority college
support at the time of their divorce.118 This decision affirmed the trial
courts’ authority to award such support and provided a more comprehensive
analysis of how the courts should approach this issue.119
F.

JOHNSON V. JOHNSON

In 1995, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued another decision
addressing post-minority child support for college expenses.120 In Johnson
v. Johnson,121 Carlotta and Daryl Johnson, husband and wife, entered into a
stipulated divorce agreement.122 According to the judgment, Daryl was obligated to “pay to each child the sum of $300.00 per month for a maximum
of four years, if any child shall attend college and maintain passing
grades.”123 For the first three years, Daryl complied with judgment for the
oldest child, Corey.124 However, because Corey refused to contact his
father upon request, Daryl refused to pay and no longer felt obligated to pay
for Corey’s final year of college.125
Based upon a contempt motion brought by Carlotta, the trial court
issued an order to show cause against Daryl.126 Following the order to
show cause hearing, the trial court vacated the previous order to show
cause, reasoning that Daryl’s obligation was for “collateral support,” not
“direct child support,” and therefore, contempt was not an appropriate
method of enforcing the judgment.127 The North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that the distinction between collateral and direct support rests
upon the kind of support that is ordered, not the age of the child for whom it
is ordered.128 If the support obligation permits a child or custodial parent
use of family property or other in-kind, non-cash benefits, the support is

117. Id. at 480.
118. See id. (upholding the trial court’s decision to require the noncustodial father to abide
by his stipulated divorce agreement and provide college support to his child).
119. See id. (addressing the issues of duration of post-minority support as well as a child’s
right to choose which college institution to attend).
120. Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663, 667 (N.D. 1995).
121. 527 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1995).
122. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d at 665.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 667.
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“collateral” support.129 If the support obligation is in the form of cash
payments for the benefit of the child, then it is “direct” support.130
The Johnson court concluded that the legislature intended for contempt
proceedings to be available to enforce all provisions of a divorce judgment,
including those ordering support for adult children.131 Thus, the court reversed and remanded for proceedings to determine whether Daryl should be
held in contempt.132 Overall, the North Dakota Supreme Court’s holding in
Johnson reaffirmed the position that post-minority child support may be
awarded for college expenses upon agreement by the parties.133
G. ZARRETT V. ZARRETT
In 1998, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Zarrett v. Zarrett.134
Robert and Linda Zarrett had two children together, Diana and David.135
The couple entered into a stipulated divorce agreement in 1990, under
which Linda would have physical custody of the children and Robert would
pay $1200 per month in child support.136 This was Robert’s second
divorce.137 Pursuant to Robert’s first divorce agreement, he was ordered to
“pay college expenses which include tuition, books, room and board for
four (4) years of college and, thereafter, for up to four (4) years in graduate
school” for his two children from his first marriage.138
In light of Robert’s college support obligation to his children from his
first marriage, Robert and Linda agreed that he would not bring a motion to
modify his child support on the basis that he was paying college expenses
for his children from a prior marriage.139 The judgment did provide that
either Robert or Linda were free to bring a motion to review the child
support payments at any time, and for any reason, other than the fact that
Robert was paying college expenses for his other children.140

129. Id.
130. Id. at 667-68.
131. Id. at 668.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 667 (determining that in appropriate circumstances a trial court may award
direct or collateral support for a child over the age of majority).
134. 1998 ND 49, 574 N.W.2d 855.
135. Zarrett, ¶ 3, 574 N.W.2d at 856.
136. Id.
137. Id. ¶ 2.
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 3, 574 N.W.2d at 857.
140. Id.
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In 1997, with the help of the Regional Child Support Enforcement
Unit, Linda sought to increase Robert’s support obligation.141 The trial
court awarded Linda $1,992 per month.142 In calculating Robert’s obligation, the Child Support Enforcement Unit deducted $33,000 from his annual
income for college expenses paid on behalf of the children from his first
marriage.143 Linda argued that the deduction for college expenses should
not be allowed under the child support guidelines.144 Robert, on the other
hand, argued that the court was correct in refusing to order the
presumptively correct amount of child support because the parties’ 1990
stipulation took into consideration Robert’s obligation to pay college and
graduate support.145
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that “[t]he language of
Robert’s first divorce decree indicates the college and graduate school
payments are in the nature of child support.”146 The Zarrett court, relying
on prior North Dakota case law, further explained that an order directing
payment of post-majority support, including college expenses, constitutes
child support.147 As such, the court concluded that the graduate school
expenses that Robert was required to pay were child support.148 Thus,
when calculating Robert’s child support obligation to Diana and David, the
children from his second marriage, the trial court must take into
consideration his college expense obligation from his first marriage.149 The
Zarrett decision emphasized that a noncustodial parent’s payments for
college or graduate school expenses are child support, and therefore, should
be considered when calculating the noncustodial parent’s child support
obligations in multi-family support cases.150

141. Id. ¶ 5.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. ¶ 9, 574 N.W.2d at 858.
146. Id. ¶ 4.
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 859.
149. Id.; see also N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-06.1 (1999) (providing a formula for
calculating support when the obligor owes a duty of support to children from more than one
family).
150. Zarrett, ¶ 14, 574 N.W.2d at 858.
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H. DONARSKI V. DONARSKI
In 1998, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Donarski v.
Donarski,151 another case involving post-minority child support for college
expenses.152 Donarski was different in that the post-minority support
resulted from a contested trial rather than the parties’ agreement.153
Kenneth and Janet Donarski were married in 1974.154 The couple had two
children together, Nathan and BethAnn.155 Kenneth also adopted Janet’s
daughter, Amy, from a prior marriage.156 Janet filed for divorce in 1996.157
At the time of the divorce, BethAnn was the only minor child involved in
the action.158
Because the parties were unable to settle, the trial court decided the
issues of the case.159 The court awarded Janet custody of BethAnn and
required Kenneth to pay child support on her behalf.160 In addition to
Kenneth’s monthly child support obligation, he was ordered to pay “onehalf of BethAnn’s reasonable college education expenses, including books,
tuition and housing.”161 The court went on to explain that “[r]easonable
expenses are those incurred in pursuing a four year degree in consecutive
years upon graduation from high school.”162 On appeal, Kenneth argued
that the trial court had no authority to order a parent to pay support for an
adult child.163
The North Dakota Supreme Court was divided in the Donarski
decision.164 Three of the five Justices, Justice Neumann, Justice Maring,
and Justice Meschke, forming the majority, held that trial courts have
authority to award post-minority child support for college expenses in

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

1998 ND 128, 581 N.W.2d 130.
Donarski, ¶ 19, 581 N.W.2d at 136.
Id. ¶ 4, 581 N.W. at 133.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18, 581 N.W.2d at 135.
Id.
Id. at 135-36.
Id. ¶ 27.
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certain situations.165 Conversely, two Justices, Chief Justice VandeWalle
and Justice Sandstrom, argued strongly that trial courts do not.166
1.

Majority Opinion

In Donarski, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
authority to order post-majority child support, including college expenses,
in a divorce action under appropriate circumstances.167 However, the court
cautioned that a trial court’s authority to award post-minority support is
limited, and must be based upon full consideration of the particular circumstances of the case.168 The court relied on a New Jersey decision that defined appropriate factors to consider when directing a parent to pay postminority support for a child’s college education.169
In evaluating the claim for contribution toward the cost of higher
education, courts should consider all relevant factors, including (1) whether
the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the
costs of the requested higher education; (2) the effect of the background,
values and goals of the parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of
the child for higher education; (3) the amount of the contribution sought by
the child for the cost of higher education; (4) the ability of the parent to pay
that cost; (5) the relationship of the requested contribution to the kind of
school or course of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources of
both parents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of the child for the
requested education; (8) the financial resources of the child, including
assets owned individually or held in custodianship or trust; (9) the ability of
the child to earn income during the school year or on vacation; (10) the
availability of financial aid in the form of college grants and loans; (11) the
child’s relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and
shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and
(12) the relationship of the education requested to any prior training and to
the overall long-range goals of the child.170

165. Id. ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136.
166. Id. ¶ 27, 581 N.W.2d at 137 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting); id. ¶ 37, 581 N.W.2d at 138
(Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
167. Id. ¶ 19, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (majority opinion); see Zarrett v. Zarrett, 1998 ND 49, ¶
14, 574 N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (holding that a court is authorized to order child support past the age
of eighteen if the court determines the support to be appropriate); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 1409-08.2(4) (1993) (stating that the court is not precluded from awarding child support beyond the
age of eighteen if the parties agree or if the court determines the support to be appropriate).
168. Donarski, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136.
169. Id. (citing Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038-39 (N.J. 1982)).
170. Id.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court asserted that, of these factors, the
parent’s ability to pay is most significant.171 The court further reasoned that
a parent cannot be compelled to contribute to an adult child’s college
expenses if the parent’s financial resources are lacking.172 In essence, the
trial court must consider all relevant factors in deciding whether to award
post-minority child support.173 The Donarski court stated, “It is essential
the court consider evidence pertaining to the amount required for college
costs, including books, tuition, room and board, and to determine the
amount that a parent can contribute without experiencing undue
hardship.”174
The North Dakota Supreme Court also relied on an Alabama decision,
Ex Parte Bayliss,175 for guidance to establish relevant factors for courts to
consider when awarding post-minority support.176 In that case, the
Alabama Supreme Court concluded that a trial court may award property or
income from either or both parents for the post-minority education of a
child of that dissolved marriage if such support is reasonable and
necessary.177 The court shall consider “primarily the financial resources of
the parents and the child and the child’s commitment to, and aptitude for,
the requested education.”178 The trial court may also consider the standard
of living that the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been
dissolved, the child’s relationship with his or her parents, and the child’s
responsiveness to parental advice and guidance.179
Turning its focus back to the facts at hand, the Donarski court held that
the trial court’s findings of fact were insufficient to justify an award of postminority support.180 Although the trial court found that Kenneth helped the
two older children with their college expenses and that he had the ability to
provide for a portion of BethAnn’s college expenses, it failed to make
specific findings on the other relevant factors to consider when awarding
support.181 The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that, although the
171. Id. ¶ 21.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Stanford v. Stanford, 628 So. 2d 701, 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993)).
175. 550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989).
176. Donarski, ¶ 22, 581 N.W.2d at 136-37 (citing Ex Parte Bayliss, 550 So. 2d at 987).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. ¶ 23, 581 N.W.2d at 137.
181. Id. Kenneth was a graduate from the University of North Dakota with a bachelor’s
degree in social work. Id. ¶ 3, 581 N.W.2d at 133. At the time of the divorce, he was employed
as the Director of the Grand Forks Housing Authority. Id. His net monthly income was
approximately $3,200 after deducting taxes and BethAnn’s health insurance. Id. ¶ 7.
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trial court attempted to define the scope of college expenses and also
imposed a consecutive four-year time limit, it placed no limit on the amount
of Kenneth’s obligation.182 The trial court said nothing about the cost or
quality of the education.183 For those reasons, the Donarski court reversed
and remanded the case for additional findings of fact on the issue of postminority child support.184
2.

Chief Justice VandeWalle’s Dissent

In his dissent, Chief Justice VandeWalle argued that neither statutory
law nor prior case law supported the trial court’s order that Kenneth pay
one-half of BethAnn’s reasonable college expenses.185 He analyzed the
1993 amendment to section 14-09-08.2(4), which the majority cited as
granting trial courts the authority to award post-minority support for college
expenses.186 The Chief Justice concluded that the language “does not preclude” found in subsection 4 only relates to the language already found in
section 14-09-08.2.187 He argued that if the legislature had intended to
require college support for adult children, it would have done so in more
direct and specific language.188 Chief Justice VandeWalle stated, “While I
hope divorced parents would continue to support their children in seeking
college educations, that is a far cry from concluding a court can impose an
obligation upon the parents to do so as a matter of law.”189 He further
observed that there are married parents who do not provide a college education for their children for a number of reasons, not all of them financial, and
they have no such obligation to provide college support for their children’s
post-secondary education.190
Therefore, according to Chief Justice
VandeWalle, a child of divorced parents should not have a greater legal
right to a college education than a child whose parents remain married.191

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. ¶ 23, 581 N.W.2d at 137.
Id.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 28, 581 N.W.2d at 137 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 32, 581 N.W.2d at 138.
Id.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 29, 581 N.W.2d at 137.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Sandstrom’s Dissent

Justice Sandstrom also dissented in Donarski, concluding that the
majority mistakenly relied on section 14-09-08.2(4) as a grant of additional
authority to award post-minority support for college expenses.192 He
argued that the majority’s holding was contrary to the plain language of the
statute and to legislative history.193 Justice Sandstrom argued that the
language “does not preclude,” found in section 14-09-08.2(4), was not an
additional grant of authority, but instead was enacted only to clarify section
14-09-08.2(2).194 He also pointed out that the New Jersey and Alabama
decisions upon which the majority relied, both involved statutory provisions
recognizing the power of a court to order post-minority support.195 Those
statutes also defined children to mean dependent children, even if the children were over the age of majority.196 North Dakota, however, defines
“child” to mean “minor,” and a “minor” is a person under the age of eighteen.197 Therefore, the trial court did not have the authority to award such
support under section 14-09-08.2.198
The Donarski decision was important to the development of postminority college support in North Dakota because it was the first case in
which the North Dakota Supreme Court relied on section 14-09-08.2(4) of
the North Dakota Century Code to affirm an award of such support.199
Accordingly, this North Dakota Supreme Court decision, as well as section
14-09-08.2 of the North Dakota Century Code, appeared to grant the trial
courts sound authority to award post-minority support for college
expenses.200

192. Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 581 N.W.2d at 139 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
193. Id. ¶ 41.
194. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2(2) provides for payment
of child support past the age of majority under the circumstances described in subsection 1 (until
the child graduates from high school or obtains the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first). N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(2) (2004).
195. Donarski, ¶ 43, 581 N.W.2d at 140 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-10-01 (1999)).
198. Id.
199. See id. ¶ 19, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (majority opinion) (holding that a court has the
authority to award post-minority support for college expenses under appropriate circumstances);
see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(4) (1993) (providing that this section does not preclude
the order of child support past the age of majority if the parties agree or if the court determines the
support to be appropriate).
200. Id.
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1999 AMENDMENT TO NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE
SECTION 14-09-08.2

In the legislative session following the Donarski decision, section 1409-08.2 was amended to: (1) eliminate the possibility of a filing fee for
filing an affidavit stating that an eighteen-year-old is still in high school; (2)
apply the section to orders that already require payment of support after the
child’s majority; (3) specify treatment during summer vacations; and (4)
give the obligor both knowledge of where the child is enrolled and the
opportunity to ask the court to terminate support if the child leaves high
school.201
The 1999 amendment to section 14-09-08.2 was the last time the
legislature addressed post-minority child support.202 As of today, North
Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2 states:
1. A judgment or order requiring the payment of child support
until the child attains majority continues as to the child until the
end of the month during which the child is graduated from high
school or attains the age of nineteen years, whichever occurs first
if:
a. The child is enrolled and attending high school and is
eighteen years of age prior to the date the child is expected to
be graduated; and
b. The child resides with the person to whom the duty of
support is owed.
2. A judgment or order may require payment of child support after
majority under substantially the circumstances described in
subsection 1.
...

201. Act of Mar. 30, 1999, ch. 143, 1999 N.D. Laws 690, 690-91; see Hearing on S B. 2073
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999 Leg., 56th Sess. (N.D. 1999) (statement of Blaine L.
Nordwall, Director of Legal Advisory Unit, North Dakota Department of Human Services)
(testifying that the regional child support enforcement office had certain concerns about the
administration of section 14-09-08.2). Some of these concerns included the following: (1) some
clerks were charging a filing fee for filing an affidavit stating that an eighteen-year-old is still in
high school; (2) it had become common for child support orders to require payment of support
past majority, using language parallel to that found in section 14-09-08.2, but which technically
removed those orders from the description in subsection 1; (3) treatment concerning support
during summer vacation remained inconsistent; and (4) obligors should have been permitted to
bring a motion to end the support if their eighteen-year-old dropped out of high school. Id.
202. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004) (indicating no additional changes beyond
the 1999 amendment).
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6. This section does not preclude the entry of an order for child
support which continues after the child reaches age eighteen, if the
parties agree, or if the court determines the support to be
appropriate. 203
It is worth noting that the 1999 amendment to section 14-09-08.2, as
well as the commentary and testimony found in the legislative history
regarding the amendment, make no mention of post-minority child support
for college expenses.204 The legislative history does not refer to the
Donarski decision, or to any other prior decision, which granted the trial
courts authority to award post-minority child support for college expenses.205 Based upon the above factors, it could logically be inferred that
the legislature supports the award of post-minority child support for college
expenses.206 However, as the next section illustrates, the North Dakota
Supreme Court had a different interpretation of the legislature’s intent.
J.

LARSON V. LARSON

In 2005, Larson v. Larson207 made its way to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.208 Glenda and Jerry Larson were married in 1978 and
divorced in 1997.209 The parties had one child together, who was twelve
years old at the time of the divorce.210 Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated
divorce agreement, Glenda received physical custody of the child, and Jerry
was ordered to pay child support.211 There was no provision in the parties’
1997 divorce judgment addressing post-minority child support for their
daughter’s college education.212 In March 2004, prior to their child’s high
school graduation, Glenda petitioned the trial court to require that Jerry pay
post-minority child support so long as their child attended college and
graduate school.213 The Larsons’ daughter excelled in both academics and

203. Id.
204. Act of Mar. 30, 1999, ch. 143, 1999 N.D. Laws 690, 690-91.
205. S.B. 2170, 1999 Leg., 56th Sess. (N.D. 1999).
206. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663, 666 (N.D. 1995) (stating that a court
presumes that the legislature is aware of judicial construction of a statute, and from the
legislature’s failure to amend a particular statutory provision, the court presumes that it acquiesces
in that construction).
207. 2005 ND 67, 694 N.W.2d 13.
208. Larson, ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d at 14.
209. Id. ¶ 2
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. ¶ 10, 694 N.W.2d at 16.
213. Id. ¶ 3.
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extracurricular activities in high school and desired to attend one of eight
prestigious colleges in the United States.214
Glenda argued that Jerry’s refusal to pay college support was a detriment to their child because many colleges consider the income of both
parents, regardless of marital status, in determining the amount of student
aid available to a child attending college.215 The daughter’s top collegiate
choice stated in its application materials that it expected both natural
parents, even when divorced or separated, to provide for educational expenses on the basis of each parent’s ability to contribute.216 The college
also required both natural parents to submit financial information and to
provide assistance for the student’s college expenses based upon their
ability rather than their willingness to pay.217 Glenda argued that Jerry, an
established attorney, had the ability to provide such support.218 The trial
court denied Glenda’s motion seeking post-minority college support, stating
that it did not have authority to amend the 1997 divorce judgment.219
In another split decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that
the trial court did not have the authority to award post-minority child support for college expenses.220 Justice Sandstrom, Chief Justice VandeWalle,
and Justice Kapsner joined in the majority opinion.221 Justice Maring provided a dissenting opinion.222 Justice Neumann, a member of the court
when this case was heard, resigned effective March 14, 2005, and did not
participate in this decision.223
1.

Majority Opinion

On appeal, Jerry first argued that the trial court had no authority to
award post-minority support for college expenses, because the issue was
raised and rejected during settlement negotiations for the divorce.224 The
North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding a strong public
policy against parental agreements that prohibit or limit the power of a

214. Id. ¶ 3, 694 N.W.2d at 14-15.
215. Id. at 15.
216. Id. at 14-15.
217. Id.
218. Brief for Appellant at 5, Larson v. Larson, 2005 ND 67, 694 N.W.2d 13 (No.
20040248).
219. Larson, ¶ 4, 694 N.W.2d at 15.
220. Id. ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d at 14.
221. Id. ¶ 17, 694 N.W.2d at 18.
222. Id. ¶ 19, 694 N.W.2d at 18 (Maring, J., Dissenting).
223. Id. ¶ 18.
224. Id. ¶ 10, 694 N.W.2d at 16.
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court to modify future child support.225 Therefore, Glenda’s right to
petition the trial court to modify Jerry’s child support obligation to include
college expenses was not waived in the original divorce judgment.226
The next major issue in the Larson case involved the interpretation of
section 14-09-08.2 and whether that statute allowed the trial court to award
post-minority child support for college expenses.227 Glenda, relying heavily
on Donarski and other prior North Dakota decisions, argued that the trial
court had the authority to award post-minority support for college expenses,
“if the court determined the support to be appropriate.”228 The North
Dakota Supreme Court rejected Glenda’s argument and concluded that
amended section 14-09-08.2 prohibits courts from modifying a divorce
judgment to include post-minority support for college expenses.229
The court found that the 1999 amendment of section 14-09-08.2, which
added a new subsection 2 providing that “[a] judgment or order may require
payment of child support after majority under substantially the circumstances described in subsection 1,” allows a court to award child support
only under circumstances similar to those of a child who obtains the age of
majority before he or she graduates from high school.230 The Larson court
concluded that the statute did not allow a court to award post-minority child
support for college expenses.231 The majority, relying on the reasoning of
Donarski dissenters, held that the “does not preclude” language of section
14-09-08.2(6) only clarifies the statutory provisions set forth in section 1409-08.2(2).232 The Larson court reasoned that the language “does not
preclude,” coupled with the legislature’s actions after Donarski, indicated
the legislature’s intent to limit post-minority child support to circumstances
substantially similar to those already expressed in the statute.233 The
majority stated, “When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit.”234

225. Id. ¶ 11 (majority opinion).
226. Id. ¶ 10.
227. Id. ¶ 12.
228. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(6) (2003)); see also Donarski v. Donarski,
1998 ND 128, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d 130, 136 (cautioning that the trial court’s authority to award
post-minority support must be based upon full consideration of the circumstances of the case).
229. Larson, ¶ 16, 694 N.W.2d at 18.
230. Id. ¶ 14, 694 N.W.2d at 17 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(2)).
231. Id.
232. Id. ¶ 15 (citing Donarski, ¶ 42, 581 N.W.2d at 139).
233. Id.
234. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Ralston v. Ralston, 2003 ND 160, ¶ 5, 670 N.W.2d 334, 335).

2006]

NOTE
2.

259

Justice Maring’s Dissent

Justice Maring wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the trial court
did have the authority to award post-minority child support for college
expenses based upon the analysis set forth in Donarski.235 Justice Maring
asserted that in 1998, the Donarski court determined under section 14-0908.2 that a trial court has the authority to order post-minority support, including college education expenses, under appropriate circumstances.236 If
the legislature truly intended to limit a trial court’s authority to award postminority child support in situations other than those described in section 1409-08.2(1), the legislature would have amended section 14-09-8.2(6) to
explicitly reflect that, or it would have eliminated altogether that part of
subsection 6 which states “or if the court determines the support to be
appropriate.”237
Justice Maring stated, “We interpret statutes to give meaning and effect
to every word, phrase, and sentence, and do not adopt a construction which
would render part of the statute mere surplusage.”238 When a statute’s language is ambiguous, because it has more than one rational meaning, the
court may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history, to ascertain
the legislature’s intent.239 Justice Maring continued by noting that although
the legislative history was limited, there was no indication that the 1999
amendment to section 14-09-08.2 was in response to the Donarski decision.240 The legislative history available indicated that the addition of subsection 2 was completely unrelated to the issue of post-minority child
support for college expenses.241
III. CONCLUSION
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2, which pertains to postminority child support, is ambiguous.242 Although the issue of post-minority support for college expenses has been addressed by the North Dakota

235. Id. ¶ 30, 694 N.W.2d at 21 (Maring, J., dissenting).
236. Id. ¶ 20, 694 N.W.2d at 18; see Donarski, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (providing that the
trial court has the authority to award post-minority college support in certain situations).
237. Larson, ¶ 22, 694 N.W.2d at 18 (Maring, J., Dissenting) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1409-08.2 (2004)).
238. Id. ¶ 27, 694 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting State v. Buchholz, 2005 ND 30, ¶ 6, 692 N.W.2d
105, 106).
239. Id.
240. Id. ¶ 28.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Larson, ¶¶ 12-15, 694 N.W.2d at 16-17 (majority opinion) (providing
conflicting interpretations regarding section 14-09-08.2); Donarski v. Donarski, 1998 ND 128, ¶¶
32-33, 581 N.W.2d 130, 138 (providing conflicting interpretations regarding section 14-09-08.2).
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Supreme Court in a number of cases, the statute remains silent.243 The only
relevant statutory language pertinent to college support authorizes the court
to provide post-minority support after the age of eighteen “if the parties
agree, or if the court determines the support to be appropriate.”244 What
does the North Dakota Legislature intend to achieve with this subsection?245
What are the North Dakota Legislature’s objectives regarding post-minority
child support for college expenses? The answers are not clear.
Prior to the Larson decision, Judy DeMers, a former member of both
the North Dakota House of Representatives and the Senate, who cosponsored the bill regarding post-minority child support, clarified the
legislature’s intentions regarding post-minority college support.246 DeMers
explained that in the early 1990s, the legislature wanted to recognize that
both custodial and noncustodial parents have a continuing responsibility to
children older than eighteen, especially if they are enrolled in college or
technical school.247 The Larson Court, however, declined to recognize an
individual legislator’s retrospective recollection as determinative legislative
intent.248 Ms. DeMers’ interpretation, had it been recorded in the legislative
history, would have provided sufficient clarity as to legislative intent.249
Due to the lack of legislative clarity, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has provided conflicting rulings on the issue of post-minority child support
for college expenses.250 If and when the North Dakota Legislature decides

243. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004) (failing to make any reference regarding
college expenses).
244. Id. § 14-09-08.2(6).
245. See Larson, ¶¶ 12-15, 694 N.W.2d at 16-17 (conveying that the language of the statute,
coupled with the legislature’s actions following Donarksi, indicates the legislature’s intent to limit
post-minority support to circumstances similar to those already expressed in the statute). For
additional guidance with statutory interpretation in North Dakota, see Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.
Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 28, 663 N.W.2d 186, 196 (articulating that the law is what
the legislature says, not what is unsaid); see also Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead YMCA, 2001
ND 134, ¶ 29, 632 N.W.2d 407, 418 (stating that the “justice, wisdom, necessity, utility and
expediency of legislation are questions for legislation, and not for judicial determination”).
246. Erin Hemme Froslie, College Bound, THE FORUM (Fargo, N.D.), Jan. 16, 2005, at A1.
247. Id.
248. Larson v. Larson, No. 200402048 (N.D. Jan. 26, 2005) (order denying request for
taking judicial notice); see also Appellant’s Request for Taking of Judicial Notice at 2, Larson v.
Larson, 2005 ND 67, 694 N.W.2d 13 (No. 20040248) (giving meaning to a single legislator’s
commentary regarding a particular bill).
249. See S.B. 2170, 1999 Leg., 56th Sess. (N.D. 1999) (failing to provide legislative
interpretation of post-minority child support for college expense).
250. See Larson, ¶ 16, 694 N.W.2d at 18 (holding that a trial court does not have the
authority to amend a divorce agreement to award post-minority child support for college
expenses). But see Donarski, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (holding that a trial court does have the
authority to award post-minority child support for college expenses in certain situations); Davis v.
Davis, 268 N.W.2d at 778 (holding that divorced parents have a duty to provide a child with a
college education).
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to grant courts explicit authority to award such support, it is unlikely that
noncustodial parent’s support obligations would be extended more than a
few years past the age of majority.251 However, an increase in the number
of years a child receives support is likely to increase the number of North
Dakota high school graduates able to receive a post-secondary education.
As the need for a college education escalates, so does the need for the North
Dakota Legislature to make a clear decision regarding post-minority child
support for college expenses.
As it stands today, until the legislature expresses itself clearly
otherwise, a noncustodial parent will only be required to provide postminority support for a college education if the parties agree to such a
provision in their divorce decree.252
Leah duCharme*

251. See Horan, supra note 3, at 606 (stating that a noncustodial parent would be faced with
an unanticipated support obligation, for an indefinite length of time, if the courts allow the award
of post-minority child support for college expenses).
252. See Larson, ¶ 16, 694 N.W.2d at 18 (concluding that section 14.09.08.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code prohibits a trial court from modifying a divorce judgment to include postminority child support). But see Donarski, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (asserting that a trial court’s
authority to award post-minority support is limited and must be based upon full consideration of
the particular circumstances of each case); Davis, 268 N.W.2d at 778 (holding that divorced
parents have a duty to provide a child with a college education).
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